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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 10-3175 
 ___________ 
 
 JOHN KLIESH, 
 
        Appellant 
 
 v. 
 
SELECT PORTFOLIO SERVICING INC; 
CREDIT SUISSE FIRST BOSTON (USA) 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Appeal from the United States District Court 
 for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
 (D.C. Civil No. 09-2726) 
 District Judge:  Honorable Legrome D. Davis 
 ____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
March 18, 2011 
 
Before: RENDELL, CHAGARES and ALDISERT, Circuit Judges 
 
 (Opinion filed: March 22, 2011) 
 _________ 
 
 OPINION 
 _________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Pro se appellant John Kliesh appeals the District Court’s dismissal of his 
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complaint under Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and exercise de novo review over the 
District Court’s order.  Ballentine v. United States, 486 F.3d 806, 808 (3d Cir. 2007).  For 
the reasons discussed below, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment.  
 This action arises out of Select Portfolio Servicing Inc.’s efforts to collect 
mortgage payments from Kliesh and its ultimate decision to foreclose on his home.  
Kliesh obtained a mortgage on September 18, 1997; the mortgage was later assigned to 
Select Portfolio.  In February 2003, Kliesh defaulted on his mortgage payments.  Over 
the years, Select Portfolio wrote numerous letters and made repeated phone calls to 
Kliesh in an effort to collect the money that Kliesh owed.  When these efforts proved 
unsuccessful, Select Portfolio instituted a foreclosure action in the Bucks County Court 
of Common Pleas.   
 Kliesh raised numerous counterclaims in the state-court action, which alleged, 
generally, that the mortgage agreement itself was illegal, that Select Portfolio had 
charged Kliesh unwarranted fees, and that Select Portfolio’s collection actions violated 
federal law.  Kliesh also charged Select Portfolio with breaching numerous procedural 
rules in the course of litigating the foreclosure action.  The Court of Common Pleas 
granted summary judgment to Select Portfolio.  The Court concluded that Kliesh’s 
various defenses were “simply attempts to prolong this litigation with further baseless 
allegations.”  The Superior Court affirmed.   
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 Kliesh then filed a complaint in federal court.  In his amended complaint, which is 
at issue here, he raised the following claims:  (1) Select Portfolio filed a fraudulent 
foreclosure action; (2) Select Portfolio violated the Truth in Lending Act (TILA), 15 
U.S.C. §§ 1601-67; (3) Select Portfolio unjustly enriched itself; (4) Select Portfolio 
violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692-1692p; (5) 
Select Portfolio violated the Fait Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-
1681x; and (6) Select Portfolio intentionally inflicted emotional distress upon him.  As 
discussed below, the District Court granted Select Portfolio’s and Credit Suisse First 
Boston’s1 motions to dismiss.  Kliesh then filed a timely appeal. 
 As a preliminary matter, Kliesh argues that Select Portfolio’s and Credit Suisse’s 
motions to dismiss were untimely and that they should not have been permitted to file 
separate motions.  These arguments fail.  Kliesh filed his amended complaint on 
September 15, 2009, and Rule 15(a)(3) of the Federal Rules of Procedure provides 
defendants with 14 days to respond.  And, since Kliesh served the amended complaint by 
first-class mail, defendants were entitled to an additional three days.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 
                                                 
1
  As this summary of the claims reveals, Kliesh made no specific allegations 
against Credit Suisse, the second defendant he named, and seems to have sued it solely 
due to its role as a parent company of Select Portfolio.  Typically, “a parent corporation 
(so-called because of control through ownership of another corporation’s stock) is not 
liable for the acts of its subsidiaries.”  United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 61 (1998).  
In any case, because we agree with the District Court that Kliesh has failed to state a 
claim against Select Portfolio, he has also necessarily failed to state a claim against 
Credit Suisse.   
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6(d).  Their responses were thus due on October 2, 2009, which is the day they were 
filed.  Moreover, Select Portfolio and Credit Suisse did not violate any rules by filing 
separate responses; they were, after all, named as separate defendants in Kliesh’s 
amended complaint. 
Kliesh also challenges the District Court’s decision to dismiss his first claim —
 that defendants filed a fraudulent foreclosure action — on the basis of the Rooker-
Feldman doctrine.  See District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 
(1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923).  According to Kliesh, he 
alleged that he was injured by the defendants, not the state-court judgment.  So construed, 
we agree that the claim is arguably not barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.  See 
Great W. Mining & Mineral Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 159, 167 (3d Cir. 
2010). 
However, even accepting Kleish’s interpretation of his claim, it is barred by 
principles of issue preclusion.
2
  Under this doctrine, “when an issue of fact or of law is 
actually litigated and determined by a valid final judgment, and determination of the issue 
was essential to judgment, the determination on that issue is conclusive in a subsequent 
action between the parties, whether on the same or a different claim.”  McNeil v. Owens-
                                                 
2
  We may affirm the District Court’s judgment on any ground supported by 
the record.  United States v. Sanchez, 562 F.3d 275, 279 (3d Cir. 2009).  Select Portfolio 
raised this defense in its motion to dismiss, and it is appropriate for us to review the state 
court opinions at the motion-to-dismiss stage to determine whether they should be 
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Corning Fiberglas Corp., 680 A.2d 1145, 1147-58 (Pa. 1996).  Kliesh claims that the 
defendants obtained the allegedly fraudulent judgment by (1) flouting the Pennsylvania 
Rules of Civil Procedure and (2) enforcing an invalid mortgage agreement.  However, he 
fully raised those precise arguments in the state proceedings, the Court of Common Pleas 
rejected the arguments on the merits and the Superior Court affirmed that court’s 
judgment, and the state courts’ rulings were essential to the final judgment.  The state 
courts’ rulings are therefore conclusive in this action and bar this claim.   
Kliesh next challenges the District Court’s rulings that his TILA, FDCPA, and 
intentional-infliction-of-emotional-distress claims are barred by the applicable statutes of 
limitations.  See 15 U.S.C. § 1640(e) (one-year statute of limitations for claims under 
TILA); 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(d) (one-year statute of limitations for claims under FDCPA); 
42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5524 (two-year statute of limitations for claims of emotional 
distress).  He attacks the Court’s reasoning on four grounds.  First, he claims that the 
District Court wrongly raised this defense sua sponte.  Kliesh is wrong; Select Portfolio 
made this argument in its motion to dismiss.  See W. Penn Allegheny Health Sys. v. 
UPMC, 627 F.3d 85, 105 n.13 (3d Cir. 2010) (defendants may raise statute-of-limitations 
defense in motion to dismiss).  Second, Kliesh argues that because the defendants have 
not yet evicted him from the property, the statutes of limitations have not begun to run on 
any of his claims.  We are aware of no precedent supporting this novel argument; in any 
                                                                                                                                                             
accorded preclusive effect.  See Lum v. Bank of Am., 361 F.3d 217, 221 n.3 (3d Cir. 
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event, because Kliesh did not raise it before the District Court, we will not entertain it on 
appeal.  See C.H. v. Cape Henlopen Sch. Dist., 606 F.3d 59, 73 (3d Cir. 2010). 
Third, Kliesh contends that he is entitled to tolling because the defendants 
fraudulently concealed their misconduct by obtaining the state judgment.  However, this 
argument misses the point; to be entitled to tolling on this ground, Kliesh must allege that 
the defendants’ conduct prevented him “from recognizing the validity of [his] claim 
within the limitations period.”  Mathews v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., 260 F.3d 239, 256 
(3d Cir. 2001).  Kliesh has not argued that the defendants’ actions misled him, and given 
his vigorous defense of the state action, it is unclear how he could.  Finally, Kliesh argues 
that equitable tolling should apply to his TILA and FDCPA claims because he previously 
raised them as state-court counterclaims.  While it is true that equitable tolling is 
available where a plaintiff has timely asserted his rights in the wrong forum, see Hedges 
v. United States, 404 F.3d 744, 751 (3d Cir. 2005), Kliesh’s counterclaims were 
themselves filed outside the limitation periods.  Accordingly, we will affirm the District 
Court’s dismissal of these claims.3 
                                                                                                                                                             
2004). 
3
  Kliesh has not presented any argument challenging the District Court’s 
dismissal of his FCRA or unjust-enrichment claim, and we agree with the District Court 
that those claims fail as a matter of law.  Further, we agree with the District Court that on 
the facts alleged, Kliesh has failed to assert a viable intentional-infliction-of-emotional-
distress claim.  Cf. Lazor v. Milne, 499 A.2d 369, 371 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985) (“An actor is 
never liable where he has done no more than to insist upon his legal rights in a 
permissible way, even if he is aware that such insistence may cause emotional distress.” 
(citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 cmt. g)). 
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Finally, Kliesh argues that he should have been given leave to amend his 
complaint.  We agree with the District Court that further amendment would be futile.  See 
Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 236 (3d Cir. 2008).  Kliesh’s claims fail 
as a matter of law, and he could not cure these deficiencies with further pleading.   
We have thoroughly reviewed the remaining arguments Kliesh has made and find 
them meritless.
4
  Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s order dismissing 
Kliesh’s amended complaint. 
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  We note also that Kliesh has presented new evidence that he alleges 
supports his claims.  While the “only proper function of a court of appeals is to review 
the decision below on the basis of the record that was before the district court, in 
exceptional circumstances a court of appeals may allow a party to supplement the record 
on appeal.”  Acumed LLC v. Advanced Surgical Servs., 561 F.3d 199, 226 (3d Cir. 2009) 
(internal quotation marks, alterations, and citation omitted).  Here, Kliesh’s new evidence 
does not address the legal obstacles that are fatal to his claims.   
